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Abstract 
Formal verification techniques have been playing an 
important role in pre-silicon validation processes. One of 
the most important points considered in performing 
formal verification is to define good verification scopes; 
we should define clearly what to be verified formally 
upon designs under tests. We considered the following 
three practical requirements when we defined the scope 
of formal verification. They are (a) hard to verify (b) 
small to handle, and (c) easy to understand. 
Our novel approach is to break down generic 
properties for system into stereotype properties in block 
level and to define requirements for Verifiable RTL. 
Consequently, each designer instead of verification 
experts can describe properties of the design easily, and 
formal model checking can be applied systematically and 
thoroughly to all the leaf modules. 
 During the development of a component chip for 
server platforms, we focused on RAS (Reliability, 
Availability, and Serviceability) features and described 
more than 2000 properties in PSL. As a result of the 
formal verification, we found several critical logic bugs 
in a short time with limited resources, and successfully 
verified all of them. This paper presents a study of the 
functional verification methodology. 
1. Introduction 
Logic verification has become more important but 
difficult to complete with increasing size and complexity 
of system on chip (SoC) designs. Powerful formal 
verification methods have been playing an important role 
in pre-silicon validation processes. On the other hand, it 
is still not realistic to verify all the functions of a SoC 
designs by formal verification methods because it requires 
lots of effort to describe design properties strictly in 
formal language. Even if such models are successfully 
developed, model checking for complex designs may be 
beyond the power of available tools and computing 
resource, resulting in fail. Therefore, hybrid verification 
methodologies using both formal verification and logic 
simulation have been discussed and proposed 
[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8].  
One of the most important and difficult points 
considered in hybrid verification methodology is to define 
a good verification scope of formal verification; i.e. what 
to be verified with formal verification techniques and 
what to be left for conventional validation with logic 
simulation. Needless to say, the goal of the project is to 
verify the design and minimize the verification effort, but 
not to apply formal verification methodology. Thus, the 
following three practical requirements should be 
considered when the formal verification criteria are 
defined. 
• Properties defined in the formal verification scope 
are hard to validate thoroughly in conventional logic 
simulation. If such properties are solved formally, it 
significantly increases the validation coverage. 
• The problem size of the properties is suitable for 
available formal verification tools. Description of the 
properties in formal language should be simple, and 
it should not take much time in model checking, so 
that we could insist superiority and efficiency 
against conventional logic simulation methods. 
• The purpose and the methodology of formal 
verification should be well documented and shared 
by the design and verification team. It is important 
to deploy the formal verification systematically in 
the design flow. 
In a development project of a component chip for 
server platforms, we considered to apply formal 
verification techniques from the viewpoint described 
above.  The component chip has strong requirements for 
RAS features and they should be verified thoroughly 
before tape out. 
In the following sections, the requirements and the 
overview of the target design are mentioned. In section 
three, design properties that are derived from the 
requirements are described in detail. In section four the 
design flow for verification is shown. Section five 
contains the result and analysis of the formal verification 
activity. Section six is our conclusions. 
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2. Target Design Overview
We have been developing a component chip for 
servers. Table 1 shows the overview of the chip 
implementation.  
The chip requires so-called ‘main-frame class’ 
reliability so that it supports enhanced RAS features to 
detect soft errors in the chip and permanent failures of a 
component. All the internal data paths, registers, state 
machines, and counters are protected by parity bits. When 
a parity error is detected, the error must be logged and 
reported according to the severity of the error. The 
requirements in implementation level are summarized as 
follows.  
• Parity protection in data paths. 
• Parity protection in key control structures, such as 
FSM and counters. 
• Illegal state detection for FSM and counters. 
As a result of initial investigation, we found more than 
1300 checkpoints for data integrity derived from the chip 
specification. It is not realistic to verify this huge number 
of checkpoints exhaustively and efficiently by logic 
simulation, simply because it will consume too much time. 
This is the initial motivation for us to set the scope of 
formal verification as data integrity checking. The 
advantages are summarized as the following. First, the 
description of the properties for integrity check is easy 
and simple because the properties are broken down into 
module level. Thus, each designer can easily describe the 
properties, and model checking can be applied locally at 
each leaf module, as described in the later section. 
Second, the properties are data-centric and exhaustive 
search is needed.  Formal model checking is right to use 
for the purpose. Also, it is possible to model the property 
in a simple and comprehensive description. 
For the above two reasons, we could expect significant 
increase in productivity with formal model checking. 
Table 1. Chip implementation
Item Implementation 
Chip die size 12.8 x 12.5 mm2
Technology 0.11 um CMOS  ASIC 
Logic size 3.5M gates 
Core frequency 250MHz 
3. Properties in Leaf Module Level 
We reached the following three properties for data 
integrity verification in leaf module level after breaking 
down the system level properties in the previous section. 
Note that we used user-written properties, and automatic 
assertion extraction was not performed. 
• Ability of error detection. 
• Soundness of internal states. 
• Output data integrity. 
Figure 1 shows abstraction of each module. In the 
following sections, each property above is explained 
based on the abstraction. The state A in the figure is for 
internal FSM and protected by odd parity. EC/ED can 
inject errors arbitrary into the state A. The state B is for 
data path and protected by odd parity. 
Three properties should be described and verified 
against all non-structured modules or leaf modules. A 
leaf module should be small enough for formal 
verification tools so that Divide-and-Conquer approach is 
the key to success for verification goals. A leaf module 
can be excluded if it has no internal state and no data 
paths with parity protection. Other important properties 
can be verified with formal verification as well, but that is 
not mandatory criteria. 
Note that we picked up Property Specification 
Language (PSL) [9] for property description because it is 
in widespread use as an industry standard and supported 
by several formal verification tools. 
Figure 1. Typical leaf module
3.1. Ability of Error Detection 
The first property is for error detection. The design 
property is to check if all the illegal values are detected 
and reported at each integrity check point. Figure 2 
shows a PSL code for this property, referring to the 
typical leaf module in Figure 1. In the PSL code, Check1 
I:      Primary Inputs 
O:     Primary Outputs 
EC:   Error Injection Control 
ED:   Error Injection Data 
HE:   Hardware Error Report 
Check1 
FSM 
I
O
ED
HE 
Check2 
ƒ
EC
A
B
A: Control State 
B: Data Path 
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and Check2 are corresponding to pCheck1 and pCheck2 
respectively. Here we have two data integrity check points. 
• Check1: HE (Hardware Error Report) is true in the 
next cycle when EC/ED is driven and the injected 
value through ED is illegal. EC should be defined 
for each FSM and counter, but ED can be shared 
between FSM and counters. 
• Check2: HE is true in the next cycle when I is illegal. 
This property means that Check1 and Check2 in 
Figure 1 should fire when an error is injected. 
Figure 2. PSL code for checking ability of error 
detection 
3.2. Soundness of Internal States 
The second property is for soundness of internal states. 
The design property is to check if the integrity of internal 
states holds as long as the integrity of primary inputs 
holds.  
• HE should not be asserted when no error is injected 
and integrity of I holds. 
This property means that Check1 and Check2 in 
Figure 1 should not fire in normal operation. Figure 3 
shows a PSL code for the property. Two properties 
(pIntegrityI and pNoErrInjection) are assumed, and one 
property (pNoError) is verified. 
Figure 3. PSL code for checking soundness of 
internal states 
3.3. Output Data Integrity 
The third property is for output data integrity. The 
design property is to check if the integrity of primary 
outputs holds as long as the integrity of primary inputs 
holds. 
• The integrity of O should hold when no error is 
injected and integrity of I holds. 
This property means that primary output O in Figure 1 
should not have parity error in normal operation. Figure 
4 shows a PSL code for the property. Two properties 
(pIntegrityI and pNoErrInjection) are assumed, and one 
property (pIntegrityO) is verified. 
Figure 4. PSL code for checking output data 
integrity 
4. Design Flow for Verification 
This section describes the design flow of formal 
verification we adopted. Figure 5 shows the overall 
design flow at the front-end side. The logic designers are 
in charge of releasing Verifiable RTL, which is explained 
in section 4.1, test scenarios for functional verification, 
and properties or specification of data integrity. A 
dedicated engineer was assigned for formal verification. 
The verification engineer creates PSL codes based on the 
specification of data integrity, performs model check, and 
makes feedback the results to the logic designers.  
4.1. Tasks of Logic Designers 
First of all, the logic designers need to release the 
Verifiable RTL code. The Verifiable RTL code should 
satisfy the following requirements. 
• Simple error injection method against every integrity 
check point is well-defined through primary input 
ports. 
• Error injection should be controlled independently 
per entity for integrity checking. 
 vunit M_soundness (M) { // soundness check 
     property pIntegrityI     = always ( I^ );   
// I should be odd parity 
     assume   pIntegrityI; //   -- assumption for I 
     property pNoErrInjection = always ( ~EC );  
// Error injection is disabled 
     assume   pNoErrInjection; //   -- assumption for EC 
     property pNoError        = never  ( HE ); 
// then no error is reported 
     assert   pNoError; //   -- check it formally! 
 } 
vunit M_edetect (M) { // check error detection ability 
     property pCheck1 = always ((EC & ~(^ED)) -> next HE);  
// ED should be odd parity 
     assert   pCheck1;  //   -- check it formally!
     property pCheck2 = always ( ~( I^) -> next HE);  
// I should be odd parity 
     assert   pCheck2;  //   -- check it formally!
 } 
 vunit M_integrity (M) { // integrity check 
     property pIntegrityI     = always ( I^ );   
// I should be odd parity 
     assume   pIntegrityI; //   -- assumption for I 
     property pNoErrInjection = always ( ~EC );  
// Error injection is disabled. 
     assume   pNoErrInjection; //   -- assumption for EC 
     property pIntegrityO     = always ( ^O ); 
// then integrity of O holds 
     assert   pIntegrityO; //   -- check it formally! 
 } 
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Figure 5. Design flow
RTL can be Verifiable by adding one line of code per 
such entity. The error injection ports should be tied to 
zero in the upper layer module because it is not used in 
real silicon. Figure 6 shows an example of such 
Verifiable RTL code in verilog. 
The second task of logic designers for formal 
verification is to release the specification of data integrity. 
It can be either in text format or described as PSL codes.  
4.2. Tasks of Verification Engineer 
Three tasks are assigned for formal verification 
engineer.
First task is to develop PSL codes if the integrity 
specification is written in text format. For portability of 
the codes, we tried not to use tool dependent features in 
the process. 
The second task is to perform model checking and 
debugging. We also consider the size of the properties in 
this process. When a property turned out beyond the 
power of available tools, for example time out happens 
during execution; the property can be divided for making 
small corns. Figure 7 shows an example of how to divide 
a property. The original property in Figure 7 (1) is for the 
output data integrity of Data D; i.e., the integrity of Data 
D should hold as long as the integrity of Data A, Data B, 
and Data C holds. The property is manually divided as 
shown in Figure 7 (2).  The followings are the details of 
the divided properties. 
− the integrity of Data A’ should hold as long as 
the integrity of Data A holds 
− the integrity of Data B’ should hold as long as 
the integrity of Data B holds 
− the integrity of Data C’ should hold as long as 
the integrity of Data C holds 
− the integrity of Data D should hold as long as the 
integrity of Data A’, Data B’ and Data C’ holds 
The last task is to feedback the results of property 
checking to logic designers for bug fix and verifiability.  
Figure 6. An example of Verifiable RTL code 
Figure 7. Partitioning a property for “Divide-and 
Conquer” approach 
 module A (...);  // wrapper module 
 ... 
 B B_in_A ( 
     ... 
     .I_ERR_INJ_C  ( 2’b00 ), 
     .I_ERR_INJ_D  ( 4’b0000 ), 
     ); 
 endmodule 
 module B (...);  // leaf module 
 input [1:0] I_ERR_INJ_C; 
 input [3:0] I_ERR_INJ_D; 
 ... 
 reg  [3:0]  cs, ns;  // for FSM (including parity) 
 reg  [3:0]  cnt, cnt_n; // for counters 
 ... 
 always @(posedge CK or posedge RESET) 
     if( RESET )  cs <= 4’b1_000; 
     else if( I_ERR_INJ_C[0] ) cs <= I_ERR_INJ_D; 
     else   cs <= ns; 
 always @(posedge CK or posedge RESET) 
     if( RESET )  cnt <= 4’b1_000; 
     else if( I_ERR_INJ_C[1] ) cnt <= I_ERR_INJ_D; 
     else   cnt <= cnt_next; 
endmodule 
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6. Results 
We used a commercial formal verification tool and an 
in-house formal verification engine. The commercial 
formal verification tool is capable of handling PSL 
properties and verilog RTL codes, equipped with various 
formal solver algorithms.
The in-house formal verification engine is a powerful 
solver for properties with UMC (unbounded model 
checking) based on POBDDs (Partitioned reduced 
Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams) and its related 
algorithms as well as combined forward and backward 
traversal for OBDD-based invariant checking. [10] 
6.1. Verified Properties 
We described 2047 PSL properties in total and all 
properties were verified successfully as shown in Table 2. 
The table shows the module names, the number of sub-
modules, the number of logic bugs found by formal 
verification, and the number of PSL properties for each 
target category. Note that the number of properties in 
Table 2 is only for assertions. It takes about 20 hours to 
verify all the properties on a typical Linux workstation 
with single CPU and single license. 
The break down of the properties in number is as 
follows; 1306 properties are for checking ability of error 
detection, 200 properties are for checking soundness of 
internal states, 520 properties are for checking output 
data integrity, and 21 properties are for checking other 
features. We found 7 logic bugs in formal verification.  
This is about 5% of total logic bugs. The following 
sections describe the detail of each logic bug, the design 
impact, and the side effect of the error injection 
implementation.  
6.2. Logic Bugs Found by Formal Verification 
This section describes the detail of each logic bug. We 
found 7 logic bugs in formal verification. Table 3 shows 
the type of property and difficulty of finding the logic 
bugs by logic simulation. 
After the detail analysis of results, B1, B3, B5 and B6 
were turned out to be difficult to detect by logic 
simulation. The details are shown below. 
B1) When a non-zero-value is written into a reserved 
field of a register, the internal parity of the register is not 
maintained correctly. Consequently, it causes an internal 
parity error. It is very difficult to find this type of logic 
bug by logic simulation because the scenario to hit this 
condition is very complicated. 
B3) Although a signal comes from a macro is not 
guaranteed immediately after release of reset, the logic 
assumes a certain value with the signal. Therefore, a false 
parity error is logged and reported. The logic bug was not 
found by logic simulation because the behavior model of 
the macro cell was wrong. Actually, this is a problem of 
logic simulation environment, so it is impossible to find it 
by logic simulation. 
B5, B6) An address decoder has ninety-one valid 
cases when decoding 8-bit address spaces. Parity 
calculation in the data path is wrong specifically for two 
cases out of ninety-one cases. The parity error is not 
always detected because it depends on the data pattern, so 
it is very difficult to detect it by logic simulation since it 
needs exhaustive data pattern.  
In summary, at least four of seven logic bugs are 
difficult to detect by logic simulation, whereas they can 
be easily found by formal verification. 
Table 2. Number of verified properties 
Type of Property Module  
Name 
# of 
Sub 
# of 
Bug P0 P1 P2 P3 Total
A 19 3 204 23 113 15 355
B 2 0 25 23 82 0 130
C 13 1 43 20 38 0 101
D 3 1 70 46 137 6 259
E 58 2 964 88 150 0 1202
Total 95 7 1306 200 520 21 2047
P0: Ability of Error Detection 
P1: Soundness of Internal States 
P2: Output Data Integrity 
P3: Other Properties 
Table 3. Classification of logic bugs 
Defect 
ID Type of Property 
Can be found by 
logic simulation 
easily? 
B0 Soundness of Internal States Yes 
B1 Soundness of Internal States No 
B2 Soundness of Internal States Yes 
B3 Ability of Error Detection No 
B4 Output Data Integrity Yes 
B5 Output Data Integrity No 
B6 Output Data Integrity No 
6.3. Design Impact and Side Effect 
This section describes the design impact and the side 
effect of the error injection implementation. Since the 
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logic for the error injection remains in the netlist as 
shown in Figure 1, we checked the design impact in 
terms of area increase and timing delay using several 
modules. Basically, the design impact is caused by a 
selector added shown in Figure 1.  
Table 4 shows the area increase caused by 
implementing the error injection feature, and the area 
increase is less than 2%. Note that module name in Table 
4 corresponds to Table 2. 
Table 4. Area increase caused by implementing 
the error injection feature 
Module Name Area Increase 
A 1.4 % 
B 0.4 % 
D 0.2 % 
The timing delay of the selector is about 200 ps that 
are about 4 % of total delay when frequency is 250MHz. 
This timing delay was acceptable for the target chip and 
caused no timing closure issue. 
In summary, the penalty caused by implementing the 
error injection feature is almost negligible in terms of 
area increase and timing delay.  
One unexpected and good side effect is that those 
remaining gates can be used as spare logic gates. We 
performed ECO (post-route fixes) six times and we used 
these remaining gates twice.  
7. Conclusions 
We have applied formal verification method when we 
developed the component chip for servers with rich RAS 
feature. There are three reasons why we adopted formal 
verification.
• The target chip requires main-frame class reliability 
so that there are huge check points for data integrity. 
It is difficult to verify the data-centric properties 
exhaustively and effectively by conventional logic 
simulation. 
• The description of the properties for integrity check 
is easy and simple because the properties are broken 
down into module level.  
• The methodology above is clear for logic designers 
to release Verifiable RTL 
Four logic designers and one verification engineer 
have developed more than 2000 PSL properties. Since the 
properties are written for leaf modules, it was easy to 
develop properties rather than logic simulation patterns.  
As a result, we found seven logic bugs. Four of seven 
logic bugs were difficult to detect by logic simulation. 
Thus, it is shown that formal verification is powerful and 
effective.  
We also investigated the design impact of 
implementing the error injection feature, and we found 
that the penalty was almost negligible in terms of area 
increase and timing delay. 
What was novel in our approach was to break down 
properties for RAS features into three stereotype 
properties. Such framework enabled us to deploy formal 
methodology systematically and thoroughly over all the 
leaf modules. Each designer designed Verifiable RTL and 
described properties quite easily, although it was a very 
difficult task to complete verification for huge number of 
integrity checkpoints. As the result of our methodology, 
we conclude that significant increase of productivity is 
achieved. 
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